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Abstract 
Four decades of neoliberal market fundamentalism and its relentless assault on the public 
sector and our understandings of publicness have generated a profound crisis of social 
reproduction and environmental sustainability. Private sector financial solutions and 
market signals have not tackled climate change at the speed and magnitude required, often 
instead magnifying our social, economic, political, and environmental challenges.  
 
This paper discusses the rediscovery of public banks and their potential—to finance low-
carbon, climate-resilient development, and as a public sector alternative that can 
overcome the shortcomings of the private sector and market approaches mentioned above. 
The paper suggests an ideal-type public bank that would be needed for a green 
transformation that is also in the public interest. The ideal type is crafted around five 
central features: mandated role; financial sustainability; operational strategy; 
democratization of governance; and integral integration of workplace and community. 
The defining characteristics of each feature can be found in existing public banks. 
 
Putting forward an alternative conceptualization that focuses on the public interest, 
sustainability and social equity concerns, this paper contributes important insights to the 
current debates on sustainable development and a just and equitable green transformation.  
 
Thomas Marois is Senior Lecturer in Development Studies at SOAS University of 
London.  
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1. Introduction 
Four decades of neoliberal market fundamentalism and its relentless assault on the public 
sector and our understandings of publicness have generated a profound crisis of social 
reproduction – that is, the integrated labours involved in giving life to and sustaining this 
and coming generations of people – and of environmental sustainability. Collective and 
complex problems have been often reduced to simplistic and atomistic responses. Short-
term profit trumps long-term planning. Personal creditworthiness is deemed more 
important than contributing to the community. Today’s youth have little expectation of 
being economically better off than their parents. Authoritarianism has reared its ugly head 
alongside renewed forms of racism and sexism. Many face an apparent dystopia of 
political inertia to confront widespread inequality and exclusion. And, if we don’t 
dramatically change how we produce energy and use natural resources, we are in 
imminent danger of cooking humanity to death. In short, the competitive individua lis m 
and market-based profit imperatives of neoliberalism and financialization have failed, 
remarkably, to resolve long-standing developmental problems. Worse yet, such market-
based approaches have magnified the social, economic, political, and environmental 
challenges we must now face. 
 
But there is hope. Indeed, not only hope, but actually existing, actionable, and desirable 
options that offer public sector alternatives to the societal challenges faced. 
Environmentalists, civil society, unions, non-governmental organizations, and academics 
have showcased such alternatives, highlighting how the public interest can be served by 
providing collective responses.1 
 
Yet the problem of financing a green transition in the public interest remains particularly 
troublesome. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 2015 Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda on Financing for Development recognize that the transition to a low-
carbon, climate-resilient (LCCR) future will require massive amounts of long-term, low-
cost, and supportive credits (estimates are in the $90 trillion range) alongside appropriate 
financial expertise. However, today’s financial system is “structured around short-term 
frameworks and horizons … where the primary concern is typically making a fast profit” 
(EPSC 2017:11). This short-term, profit-oriented approach is not an accident. It reflects 
conventional policy frameworks that have promoted private sector financial solutions, 
hoping that market signals would sufficiently confront the climate financing challenge. 
Private finance has responded at neither the speed nor magnitude required. 
 
In response, policy makers have rediscovered public banks. These are banks owned and 
controlled by the state or some other public entity governed under public law. These banks 
operate at the municipal, state/provincial, national, regional, and multilateral levels. And 
they can work differently than private banks. Whereas corporate banks must first respond 
to profit imperatives, public banks need not. This is because public banks are mandate-
driven institutions. Their mandates may include municipal, national, or international 
development goals; agricultural and small trades support; water infrastructure; export 
trade; tourism; and so on. Public bank mandates may or may not include turning a profit.  
If mandated to profit, this may be on equal footing with other mandates. This depends on 
a public bank’s social and political context, which differs fundamentally from the 
imperative to maximize profits characteristic of private corporate banks. Consequently, 
public banks can excel at pursuing mandates like sustainable development. 
 
                                              
1
  McDonald and Ruiters 2012; Pradella and Marois 2015; Kishimoto and Petitjean 2017; Jones and O’Donnell 2017. 
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Public banks, moreover, retain significant financial capacity. Despite 40 years of 
neoliberal privatization efforts, public banks control some 25 percent of all global banking 
assets, holding $35 trillion in assets that constitute about 46 percent of global GDP (de 
Luna-Martínez and Vicente 2012; Orbis 2017). Most experts now agree that mobilizing 
these public financial resources could prove catalytic in driving alternative and green 
development strategies.2 
 
Yet public banks are only potentially catalytic and there is no rock-solid guarantee that 
their resources will be used in the public interest. Some public banks continue to plough 
money into dirty oil and coal energy while others get mired in corruption scandals.3 Public 
banks have had to adapt themselves to the post-1980s competitive context of neoliberal, 
finance-led capitalism in ways that often mimic private banking practices (Marois 2012). 
During this same time, market advocates and mainstream academics have undermined 
societal perceptions of the value of public services in general and the effectiveness of 
public banks in particular. Privatization was universally advocated. The ongoing crisis of 
climate financing, however, has demanded rethinking of public banks’ potential. Here, 
too, there is no guarantee it will be in the public interest. 
 
The public banking rethink has emerged over the last decade and involved key institutions 
like the World Economic Forum (WEF), World Bank, and Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). These global institutions have “rediscovered” , 
and in turn attempted to “reclaim”, public banking for their own market-based, private-
sector oriented, sustainability narrative (WEF 2006; OECD 2017). The argument is that 
public banks should facilitate the leveraging of private financial resources by absorbing 
the financial and capital accumulation risks of the global green transition (WEF 2006; 
Smallridge et al. 2013). That is, public banks ought to wrap green investments in public 
guarantees to decrease private risks and increase private returns so as to make green 
projects “bankable” for the private sector (Levy 2017). Repackaged private interests 
continue to supersede the public interest. 
 
On the one hand, we need new, catalytic financial alternatives to confront the challenges 
of contemporary capitalism – most notably, the challenge of a global green transition. On 
the other hand, the crafting of alternative financial mechanisms should not be left to 
conventional institutions and private interests. Critical scholars must not shy away from 
offering programmatic responses to real world problems. Unions, activists, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and academics 
can together rethink how they have engaged public banking and the financing of the green 
transition. 
 
To this end, I am concerned with the following question: What is the type of public bank 
needed for a green transformation that is also in the public interest? What the “public 
interest” might be is, indeed, tricky to define. There is no single or easy answer (cf. 
McDonald 2016). And I make no claim to offer a definitive interpretation. Yet my 
understanding is that the public interest is more of a historical social process than a thing 
in and of itself. It is about nurturing informed, sober, democratic decision making aimed 
at providing for one’s community before individual enrichment and against bigoted 
practices. The public interest means respecting and protecting future generations from 
harm – be it social, political, economic, or environmental. Pursuing the public interest has 
no guarantee of success and no hope of being uncontested. It does nevertheless have the  
potential to promote an awareness of mutual interdependence and an ethics of 
                                              
2
  Smallridge et al. 2013; Cochran et al. 2014; Marois 2015; OECD 2017 . 
3
  cf. Tricarico 2015; Cochran et al. 2015; RAN et al. 2017. 
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stewardship, mutual care, and collaboration in one’s community (Wainwright 2014). The 
public interest is served, reflexively, by the public sector’s potential to prioritize public 
benefits over private profits; to create public efficiency gains; to democratize the 
economy; to mobilize the useful knowledge of public workers; to work collaboratively 
across borders; and to promote decent jobs and working conditions for people. This paper 
therefore ties the public interest to any substantive green transformation. 
 
Returning to the question of what type of public bank is needed, the answer offered here 
proposes an ideal-type public bank. This prototype of a green public bank working in the 
public interest is crafted around five central features: mandated role; financial 
sustainability; operational strategy; democratization of governance; and integral 
integration of workplace and community. As an exercise in ideal-type building, the paper 
remains, by design, a work in progress intended to provide a theoretically informed but 
concrete, if always malleable, model public bank that can confront the global green 
transformation, which necessarily overlaps with wider social transformation strategies. 
Following a section explaining how I approach an ideal-type model, the bulk of the paper 
then elaborates on the five core features. This is followed by a brief conclusion. 
2. Arriving at an Ideal-Type: Methodological and 
Analytical Considerations 
Critical, Marxian-inspired academic work rarely experiments with ideal-type 
methodologies, which are more common to Weberian scholarship – but it is not unheard 
of (cf. Cox 1987). Indeed, there are calls for radical, alternative, programmatic responses 
to global challenges, like climate change; and the wider failures of capitalism to resolve 
them have been noted (Castree and Christophers 2015). This paper is crafted with this in 
mind, drawing from a history of academic research and policy advocacy. This has 
involved a sustained critique of bank privatization (Marois 2012) and subsequent policy 
and NGO-oriented engagement with public sector alternatives.4 The ideal-type features 
discussed below draw substantively on the Eurodad report (Romero 2017). However, this 
paper expands and modifies the features by employing an explicit critical political 
economy lens and public interest optic; by tailoring the features more closely to a green 
transformation; and by including public commercial (not just development) banks in the 
ideal-type. 
 
The ideal-type public bank constructed relies on an inductive-like “adding up” strategy. 
While all features do not exist in any single public banking institution, each feature 
discussed is in operation in one or more public banks. The empirical basis of evidence is  
diverse, deriving from an extensive reading of the secondary literature; popular media; 
and public bank official reports. The features also draw from nearly 200 interviews with 
public banking and public bank–related individuals over a period of research spanning a 
decade. Yet the work is far from complete. As such, it is likely that the contents of this 
ideal-type green public bank will change (a) as I research new public banks and features 
and (b) as certain characteristics do not live up to their promise. 
 
The approach here differs from the bulk of conventional neoclassical research, which is 
rooted in a positivist and purportedly value-neutral approach to economics (Lawson 
2013). Conventional approaches see public banks as inherently inefficient and suboptimal 
substitutes for more efficient market-oriented private banks.5 This approach continues to 
                                              
4
  See Marois 2013; Marois and Güngen 2013; Marois 2017a, 2017b; cf. Romero 2017. 
5
  Mishkin 2009; World Bank 2012a; Calomiris and Haber 2014. 
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inform conventional understandings, despite the importance now given to public banks 
to help overcome the climate crisis.6 The potential of public banks is limited to filling 
market gaps; overcoming short-term crises; or, in some cases, making markets for private 
goods. 
 
Heterodox Keynesian and developmental economics approaches differ by envisioning a 
more positive role. Public banks are seen as effective financiers of new investments, 
infrastructure, innovation, and green transformation.7 Yet while differing in the scope for 
government-led financial interventions, Keynesian developmental approaches tend to 
share a similar normative (often overarching) concern with neoclassical economists for 
maximizing market growth and private investment. Private interests and market 
development often shape what the public interest should reflect and what the public sector 
should do in policy terms. 
 
In contrast to approaches that foreground private interests, the approach proposed here 
aims towards a collectively and democratically determined public interest; the 
emancipation of workers and the poor; a substantive green transformation; and the 
democratization of banking. Therein, the focus on public banking institutions as a locus 
of progressive change is anything but common. Still, it is unlikely that any alternative to 
neoliberalism can avoid problems of finance, money, and debt (cf. Itoh and Lapavitsas 
1999). 
 
Analytically, the ideal-type draws on a Marxian-inspired “social content” approach to 
financial institutions like public banks. As argued elsewhere, public banks are seen as 
“institutionalized social relations that reflect historically specific relations of power and 
reproduction between the banks, other firms, the state, and labor in general” (Marois and 
Güngen 2016:1291). This approach incorporates both historical-structural and class-
based individual and collective agent-led factors in understanding the specificity of a 
given financial institution (cf. Hilferding 1981[1910]; Marois 2012). Analytically, a 
social content approach opens to the door to concretely changing these public institutions 
and of doing so in the democratic, green, public interest. 
 
That said, critical scholarship typically focuses on the agency of individual and class 
actors (political and economic) who benefit from neoliberalism – actors that are 
incessantly reshaping and changing neoliberal policies and institutions according to their 
own reproductive landscapes and self-interests (Brenner et al. 2010:202-3). Bob Jessop’s 
critical geographical work develops this idea of institutional malleability by individua l 
and collective actors, particularly in his notion of state spatial strategies (2016:23-24): 
 
These strategies refer to the historically specific practices through which state (and 
imperial) institutions and state managers (and the social forces they represent) seek 
to reorder territories, places, scales, and networks to secure the reproduction of the 
state in its narrow sense, to reconfigure the sociospatial dimensions of the state in 
its integral sense, and to promote specific accumulation strategies, state projects, 
hegemonic visions, or other social imaginaries and projects. 
 
As a form of state spatial strategy Jessop adds the concept of “institutional fix” (2016:25; 
emphasis added): 
 
… a complementary set of institutions that, via institutional design, imitation, 
imposition, or chance evolution offer (within given parametric limits) a temporary, 
                                              
6
  WEF 2006; World Bank 2012a, 2012b; OECD 2017. 
7
  Thirlwall  2011; Mazzucato and Penna 2015; Griffith-Jones 2015. 
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partial, and relatively stable solution to the coordination problems involved in 
securing economic, political, or social order. Nonetheless, it is not purely technical 
and, rather than providing a post hoc solution to pre-given coordination problems, 
it is partly constitutive of this order. It rests on an institutionalized, unstable 
equilibrium of compromise … 
 
In short, the critical social sciences are conceptually strong in understanding change in 
sociospatial and institutional terms from the perspective of agents of neoliberalism. To be 
sure, the changes specified do not unfold unproblematically or always as intended, but 
evidently individuals and collectively have actively changed ours into a neoliberal world. 
By extension, we also know that conventional actors know that public banks are malleable 
to their interests (WEF 2006; OECD 2017). What is less known is that public institutions 
can also be moulded and modelled to the public interest. The problem here has been for 
Marxian-inspired scholarship to remain more critical than creative, being more focused 
on the problematique than being programmatic. 
 
The approach of this paper is to turn the critical geographical framework on its head as a 
programmatic alternative strategy capable of advancing change in the public interest.  
Those seeking to transcend neoliberalism must not abandon the space of finance. As 
argued elsewhere, the insistence on reclaiming public banks sees the struggle for the 
democratized control of banks as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for any 
substantive anti-neoliberal strategy (Marois 2015:27). But there is more to it than just the 
control over public banks (and money). Rather, the struggle for the democratized control 
of banking and finance has “the unique potential to connect all resistances to 
neoliberalism and transcend capitalism” (Marois 2015:32). 
 
The advantage of drawing on a mix of social content and critical geography approaches 
is that social forces (composed of individual and collective agents) are understood as 
pursuing sociopolitical and spatial strategies to help realize their interests and to manage 
the contradictions that recurrently arise in contemporary capitalism. The institutiona l 
fixes pursued, while predominantly undertaken at the national level, are nonetheless 
integrally linked to global and subnational scales and processes (Jessop 2016:25). A 
programmatic strategy conceived in this way avoids the pitfalls of fetishizing the national 
scale as, on the one hand, outside the world market and, on the other hand, as not being 
constituted by social relations occurring at the local and subnational scales. In short, by 
employing a critical geographical framework one can hone in on a very specific level or 
scale, like the institutional focus on public banks, without sacrificing an understanding of 
that relation as set within other levels or scales of generality (cf. Ollman 1993:41). 
 
Within the above framework an ideal-type public bank does not just suppose a utopian 
vision detached from history or context, but rather offers a theoretically, historically, and 
concretely informed condensation, from which the resulting model can be debated, 
reworked, and acted upon by social agents in the specificity of their own social, political, 
economic, and environmental circumstances. 
3. A Green Public Bank in the Public Interest: 
Five Features 
The following five sections – mandated role; financial sustainability; operational strategy; 
democratization of governance; and integral integration of workplace and community – 
concretely develop an ideal-type public bank. The work builds from and extends Romero 
(2017). It does so specifically in light of the public interest, as noted above, and of the 
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global green transition challenge. In terms of the latter, the five features have at their core 
some intended contribution to confronting the green challenge. Space constraints prohibit 
detailed elaboration under each feature. But it is important to note that the public bank as 
envisioned has a core set of green financing tenets. These include the following: 
 
 Funds low-carbon, climate-resilient projects and programmes in the public interest. 
 Demonstrates a substantial reduction in carbon emissions and environmental 
protection in its external lending and internal operations. 
 Operates in ways that are financially sustainable. 
 Protects poor and vulnerable people, while encouraging sustainable means of social 
reproduction and employment. 
 Is democratically and environmentally accountable in decision making. 
 Promotes the building of a communal ethos of sustainability. 
 Develops internal green transformational capacity, including innovative and creative 
thinking among staff. 
 Assesses financial risks according to the public interest and environmental 
sustainability. 
 
With these sustainability caveats in mind, we can proceed to the public bank features. 
These features, while appearing common-sense to many, often involve a dramatic 
departure from the usual practices of private corporate banks and some public banks. 
3.1 Mandated Role 
A public bank’s mandate is the financial institution’s most fundamental feature, 
determining its character, current operating ethos, and future orientation. It is the 
foundation upon which a bank’s legitimacy can and should be assessed by its affected 
community, which includes owners and shareholders (public and possibly private); 
employees and management; and the citizens and social groups served. The social content 
of any public bank mandate is subject to social and class struggles over who benefits from 
the bank. The mandate is the crux of contestation, stating what the bank must do. 
 
There are many types of bank mandates, from supporting farmers to economic 
development, all of which have arisen in specific historical and material circumstances. 
Whatever the particular policy mandate is, public bank mandates should provide 
authoritative direction to its operations and policy strategies. 
 
Ideally, social forces should be seeking to ensure that public bank mandates, at a 
minimum, reflect a triple bottom line geared towards transformative socioeconomic 
change (cf. UNRISD 2016). For example, a “triple bottom line” mandate would include 
commitments to green transformation, social development, and financial sustainabilit y. 
These are not economically neutral concepts, and therefore need to be democratically 
established vis-à-vis a public interest ethos. 
 
Four characteristics can help support a green, social, and sustainable mandate: strength of 
purpose and direction; stable, long-term horizons; progressive public ethos; and a 
commitment to strategic public–public cooperation. 
 
Strength of purpose and direction 
Governing authorities typically build and mandate public banks with a particular societal 
or developmental challenge in mind, such as postwar reconstruction; providing loans to 
the poor; servicing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and trades; agriculture; 
supporting industrialization or export promotion; building infrastructure; greening the 
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economy; and more (cf. Marois and Güngen 2016). The mandate should give public banks 
and their managers strength of purpose and direction. 
 
It is worth noting that public development banks tend to have narrower policy-specific 
mandates while public commercial or universal banks tend to have more multipurpose 
ones. But this is not necessarily so. Strength of purpose and direction should derive from 
acting consistently and accountably towards a mandate that has democratic and popular 
legitimacy, whatever that may include, while guarding against mandate drift. It follows 
that strong directionality should not be pre-emptively limited, as conventional policy 
makers aim to do, to simply filling market gaps left by private banks or barred from 
competing with private corporate banks (cf. Mazzucato and Penna 2015). These 
limitations are meant to protect private interests, not the public interest or working class 
interests. 
 
Green mandates should be strong and cut across the fullness of a public bank’s operations, 
ensuring consistency and efficacy in reducing carbon emissions in the public interest. 
 
Stable, long-term horizons 
Public banks are in a unique and powerful position because they exist within the public 
sphere and hence need not be the handmaidens of short-term profit imperatives. Instead, 
public banks can excel at providing finance according to a stable, long-term horizon. 
Long-term financial horizons can enable economic stability and support transformational 
socioeconomic and political initiatives like environmental sustainability, green public 
infrastructure, and job creation (Romero 2017:15). It is an important step towards the 
definancialization of social reproduction. 
 
Likewise, public banks can be effective countercyclical lenders by increasing lending at 
times of economic and political uncertainty or crisis (World Bank 2012a; Brei and 
Schclarek 2013). Private corporate banks, by contrast, tend to act pro-cyclically during 
crises by reducing their lending to protect capital resources and profitability. A public 
bank’s countercyclical function, however, must be treated critically and approached 
cautiously. Without democratic oversight and accountability, elite authorities can abuse 
public bank countercyclical lending in ways that act against the public interest; increase 
inequality by privileging the needs of capital over labour; and act against popular interests 
by reinforcing unequal economic systems like neoliberalism (Marois and Güngen 2016). 
Countercyclical lending is not necessarily a good thing, but it can be if mobilized in the 
public interest, to promote low-carbon alternatives, and to support social equity goals. 
 
Progressive public ethos 
The sine qua non of an authentically public bank is that it must pursue public policy for 
the public interest. That is, its service standard must be qualitatively different than private 
corporate banks insofar as it is in the public interest. Yet there is nothing essentially 
progressive about “the public” or easy about “making” the public, as a public institution’s 
ethos depends on the historical and social forces shaping it (cf. McDonald 2016). There 
are of course today public banks that act very much like private, profit-oriented banks 
with little regard (or mandate) for serving the public interest. For public banking mandates 
to be progressive in fact and practice, they must be transformational in ways that benefit 
the public interest. This is no simple task and not easily measured. Beginning with the 
triple bottom line is a solid baseline measure for projecting a public ethos – as is a 
commitment to public–public cooperation. 
UNRISD Working Paper 2018–3 
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Commitment to strategic public–public cooperation 
Public banks and public institutions are well positioned to facilitate the building of 
sustainable local, national, and international coalitions of willing public sector entities 
that cooperate for the public interest and not on competitive profit-oriented grounds (cf. 
Wainwright 2014; Mazzucato 2015). This is possible if and when social forces pressure 
governing authorities to do so. There are examples. Locally, nationally, and 
internationally, governing authorities mandate public banks to fund municipal, national, 
and regional infrastructure; public banks supporting local governments by purchasing 
public bonds; public development banks underwriting developmental loans distributed by 
public commercial banks; public banks funding community associations and cooperative 
projects; public banks funding the greening of existing public buildings; public banks as 
repositories of public sector savings and pensions; among others. This type of cooperation 
not only thwarts the narrow logic of market discipline but also goes some way to 
recreating a public ethos so maligned under self-interested neoliberal strategies of 
development. 
3.2. Financial Sustainability in the Public Interest 
Financial sustainability is required if public banks are to serve in the public interest. Yet 
as a concept, financial sustainability is subject to contested and ideologically charged 
interpretations. Mainstream approaches narrow financial sustainability to maximizing 
returns, using private banks’ experiences as the touchstone. An alternative approach 
considers how public banks can aim to guarantee the efficient, long-term, political and 
economic reproduction of their core mandated services, democratically and in the public 
interest. Positive financial returns or break-even remain a key consideration, but not the 
only consideration. Financial sustainability in this way recognizes that public banks are 
also public institutions with public mandates that should contribute to overcoming 
societal challenges. One might think of this as a fundamental duty of care over society’s 
collective, public financial resources. It follows, then, that a progressive sustainabilit y 
strategy, furthermore, should not place excessive financial risks or costs onto the public 
sphere when those risks are fundamentally in the private interest (for example, bailouts 
and socializing private sector losses). 
 
Operationally, the financial sustainability of public banks depends on their particular mix 
of (a) not-for-profit and loss-making concessionary lending, and (b) for-profit non-
concessionary lending (cf. Cochran et al. 2015; Romero 2017). Financial sustainabilit y 
must further balance itself against generating returns versus reinvestment or the 
remittance of returns to authorities; balancing risk and innovation in lending; and 
balancing operating costs and a public ethos. These are discussed in turn. 
Balancing bank returns with reinvestment and public remittances 
Historically most public banks were not mandated to earn returns but rather to support 
development, often at an operational loss. Today, demands on public banks to generate 
returns and to remit these to government are more common, driven in large part by the 
post-1980s emergence of neoliberalism. Neither strategy is neutral in class terms or 
understandable outside of contesting power relations over access to credit. A progressive 
public bank must internalize, make transparent, and democratize these struggles for the 
bank to be able to work in the public interest. 
 
Operationally, public banks can and do continue to accept lower levels of returns in order 
to privilege concessionary and not-for-profit lending for mandated programmes. In cases 
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where mandated lending generates real losses for the bank, financial sustainabilit y 
requires that either (a) governing authorities directly compensate the public bank for 
incurred losses or (b) that the bank establishes an internal cross-subsidy (that is, non-
concessionary lending covers concessionary). Both support financial sustainability. 
 
When a public bank generates annual positive returns, it can also use these returns for 
reinvestment (including cross-subsidization) or it can remit them to its public 
shareholders. Some argue that public banks ought only to reinvest returns into mandated 
programmes: if a government derives monetary benefits from a public bank’s operations 
then this may create an incentive to abuse the bank as a source of public revenue (cf. 
Griffith-Jones 2016; Romero 2017). This is possible, but it is not necessarily so. Many 
public banks have worked sustainably for decades while transferring returns into 
government coffers. The point is to define a legitimate process by which any such transfer 
occurs. 
Balancing risk and innovation 
Financial sustainability is closely tied to a public bank’s approach to risky, long-term, 
and/or innovative lending. Such investments and lending can involve major time 
commitments, substantial levels of non-performing loans, and potentially hard losses. But 
such investments can also generate long-term public benefits, developmental 
achievements, and innovative breakthroughs (Mazzucato 2015). In this way financial 
sustainability does not involve public banks only supporting projects with guaranteed 
returns on investment, but ones that can embody the public interest and long-term 
environmental sustainability. A public interest optic is diametrically opposed to the 
general thrust of that being typically promoted by international institutions like the World 
Bank and OECD. For these institutions the investment risks absorbed by public financial 
institutions should first and foremost enable private interests and accumulation via public 
sector de-risking and profitability support programmes.8 The approach is not unlike oft-
failed, but nonetheless resilient, public-private partnership model (cf. Bayliss and Van 
Waeyenberge 2017). 
 
Balancing risk and reward also involves the issue of fractional reserve banking. This 
system enables banking institutions to take deposits and hold reserves, and then to offer 
loans in excess of these amounts. For example, commercial banks can lend out at least 10 
dollars for every one dollar held in reserves for a 10:1 ratio. Development banks tend to 
operate more conservatively, with a lending ratio of about 3:1. In this way banks can 
mobilize financial resources in ways exponentially greater than if investments received 
direct government funding (a ratio of 1:1) (von Mettenheim 2010:11, 21-22). This is one 
of the chief ways in which “green” public banks can serve as catalytic financial drivers 
of the LCCR transformation. Multiplying financial reserves, however, carries risk and 
thus needs to be carefully planned for by public banks and responsible authorities. 
Balancing operating costs and a public ethos 
A bank’s operating costs, which include fixed capital, IT, and staff costs, significantly 
affect its “bottom line” and long-term financial sustainability. On the one hand, public 
banks must provide the necessary infrastructure (fixed and IT) to compete and provide 
competent services relative to private competitors. There is no escaping the competitive 
market in this regard. On the other hand, public banks must retain qualified staff to operate 
effectively. Both issues need to be balanced against the public bank pursuing a triple 
bottom line and operating in the public interest. For example, technological investments 
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  WEF 2006; World Bank 2012b; OECD 2017. 
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can reduce costs and increase efficiencies just as infrastructure greening can help make 
banks “carbon neutral”. Similarly, staff must be compensated competitively, but 
compensation must not reinforce runaway compensation and high-risk reward structures 
driven by private sector “casino”-like accumulation imperatives. Rather, non-monetary 
incentives associated with working in the public sector (for example, better work-life 
balance) and for the public interest (that is, contributing to society positively) can be 
mobilized alongside transparent fixed pay ratios between the highest and lowest paid 
employees (not unlike set ratios in cooperatives like Spain’s Mondragón or in more 
unionized bank sectors such as in India or Costa Rica where pay extremes are less 
common). Formalizing staff input into a public bank’s governance structures, too, can 
internalize public ethos commitments to the bank, to one’s community, and to the public 
interest. 
3.3 Operational Strategy 
Operational Strategy refers to a bank’s core financial intermediation processes. As linked 
to lending and fractional reserves above, financial intermediation involves collecting 
savings, magnifying them, and then allocating these monetary resources as credit to those 
who require it. That is, banks channel money from the “capital rich” to the “capital poor”  
for a price. The “price” is the cost of borrowing, which is largely reflected in the interest 
rate, fees, and commissions. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that money is far from neutral. Money and the credit system 
are integral to the reproduction and expansion of capitalist accumulation, which is a class-
based system of exploitation and development (Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999). Decisions over 
credit allocation can drive increased profitability for capital; help build infrastructure; 
feed financial speculation; create public services; support farmers; or any number of 
things. No lending or investment strategy is socially neutral but instead deeply political 
in its economic and social implications. An environmentally and socially just operational 
strategy should expose its lending decisions to popular oversight to avoid abuse. 
 
Two operational strategies vis-à-vis intermediation need singling out: (a) acquiring 
sources of finance capital and (b) investing finance capital. 
Acquiring sources of finance capital 
To protect their capacity to operate in the public interest, public banks should ensure that 
their primary sources of finance are public in origin (Romero 2017). If a public bank relies 
disproportionately on private sector decisions to access its lending capital, its capacity to 
operate in the public interest will be structurally undermined. Private finance withholds 
needed resources and withdraws funding as and when it is in their private (not public) 
interest (this is reflected in the procyclical lending of private banks discussed above). 
Having a solid foundation of public money can also assist public–public cooperation 
while mitigating the threat of private interests crowding out the public interest. 
 
These public sources may or may not involve borrowing (cf. OECD 2017:4). Sources of 
non-borrowed public funds (assets) involve a range of conventional and innovative 
sources. These include: dedicated or reallocated funds from annual budgets; an allocated 
percentage of tax revenue; grants; retained earnings; direct capital injections from 
government or other public sector entities; and official callable capital (that is, official 
promises to pay should funds be requested). Some less conventional but innovative 
“green” sources include carbon levies and taxes; emissions trading revenues; and utility 
bill or energy efficiency surcharges. 
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Some sources of borrowed or repayable public funds (liabilities) include the following: 
deposits from the public sector [state-owned enterprises (SOEs); employees]; bonds sold 
to other public sector enterprises or central banks; loans from national, regional, and 
multilateral public banks; loans from the government; and investments from public 
pension funds. Some sources of repayable private finance capital are also widely available 
to public banks, including individual deposits; loans; and bonds issued in national and 
international markets, including green or climate bonds as well as some impact bonds. 
 
Public banks that retain access to public money to generate stable, low-cost, and long-
term forms of finance in the public interest can significantly reduce or eliminate market 
pressures to maximizing profit over mandated priorities. This is an indispensable element 
of any long-term green transformational strategy conceived of in the public interest (cf. 
EPSC 2017). 
Investing finance capital 
How public banks invest their financial resources should follow from the bank’s mandate 
(as opposed to simply being driven by profit imperatives) and have substantive links to 
democratically determined and accountable national development plans. As noted, such 
investment strategies can be done at below market concessionary (break-even or loss-
making) and non-concessionary market (return-generating) terms. Green strategies, it 
follows, should ensure substantive transformation towards a LCCR future in the public 
interest. This should, too, counteract emerging green-washing strategies of accumulation.  
 
A wide range of financial instruments are available for public banks to invest, allocate, 
and mobilize their financial resources. They include the following: 
 
 Grants: do not need to be repaid, and may be tied to government or donor 
programming. 
 Standard loans: must be repaid by the borrower, at concessional or non-concessional 
rates. 
 Development loan: often concessional and repayable, may combine sources of 
government or donor funds. 
 Official donors: directly from donors, but channelled through the public bank as 
intermediary. 
 Equity investment: involves taking a direct ownership stake in a project or company. 
 Public–private partnerships: involves assisting the private sector to undertake 
public works backed by official risk and profit guarantees. 
 Public–public partnerships: involves public sector collaboration in undertaking 
public works where risks are shared within the public sector. 
 Risk sharing: agreements that involve guarantees, or structured financial agreements. 
 Technical assistance: agreements to provide supportive expertise and assistance at 
little or no cost to the recipient. 
 Green bonds: for those who want to channel funds into sustainable development 
projects. 
 
Not all of the above are intended to work in the public interest, for example public-private 
partnerships, and should not be treated as equal from a public interest optic. It is more 
likely that subsidized concessionary lending and non-repayable grants will facilitate 
equitable development and green priorities (UNRISD 2016:126; Romero 2017). That 
said, the issue of non-concessionary or return-generating public bank lending is 
controversial. On the one hand, conventional and heterodox economists often assert that 
public banks should not compete with private banks or operate in ways that may “crowd 
out” private banks (Ratnovski and Narain 2007). This position advocates that public 
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banks abandon operational areas where they might earn positive returns. But such 
earnings can be used to effectively cross-subsidize other operations, so why allow only 
private banks to benefit? On the other hand, proponents of public banking for the public 
interest may be uncomfortable with any operations being explicitly oriented towards 
generating returns, as this might undermine the public interest mandate. Yet if returns 
fund otherwise unfundable priorities, is this not in the public interest too? The resolution, 
or compromise, cannot be predetermined but must be found within the affected 
community that owns the public bank. 
 
Investing also involves the use of official guarantees, which is yet another contentious 
issue. The financial stability and sustainability of public banks often rely on direct and 
indirect official government guarantees. Official guarantees tend to enhance a public 
bank’s credit rating and stability prospects relative to similar private banks. On the one 
hand, official guarantees enable public banks to access cheaper and longer-term sources 
of public and private finance capital, whose savings can be passed along to clients, public 
and private. On the other hand, official guarantees also enable public banks to take a 
longer-term perspective, and one less reliant on profit imperatives or market conditions. 
Both functions can help to mitigate the volatile effects of neoliberal financialization on 
society and the environment. Yet caution must be exercised, as official guarantees can be 
abused for lending that is not fit for purpose, that contradicts the public bank’s mandate 
and mission, or that renders the bank financially unsustainable. This risk is perhaps 
greatest with countercyclical lending at times of financial crisis when governing 
authorities absorb, or socialize, private sector debts (Marois 2014; Trumbo Vila and 
Peters 2017). Hence, powerful democratic oversight and governance processes must be 
in place to ensure appropriate use of official guarantees for the public interest. 
 
Finally, there are pros and cons to public banks drawing on private sources of finance 
capital. Because public banks are backed by a sovereign guarantee (implicitly or 
explicitly), they can access private bond markets at favourable conditions. Public banks 
should be able to access greater amounts of cheaper loanable capital, which can be then 
directed to mandated projects. This is no doubt useful. In addition, arguably, by absorbing 
private capital for the public interest public banks can help to “definancialize” and 
“decarbonize” existing pools of private finance capital.9 That is, by leveraging private 
finance in the public interest and for democratically determined projects, public banks 
can ease the competitive, profit-maximizing structural pressures that characterize most 
contemporary global finance and development processes and ensure these funds are not 
invested in instability-generating sectors or carbon intensive industries. Of course, there 
is no necessary reason for public banks to do this. Yet given a democratic mandate and 
oversight, public banks can drive these two positive trends. 
Spatial strategy in the public interest 
Spatial strategy, drawing on our socially constructed and constitutive theorization above, 
refers to the geographically local, national, and international operations of public banks 
and how the banks engage with governing authorities at these scales of activity. The issue 
of scale is not straightforward. In some cases, public banks are local in constitution and 
only engage locally (for example, most municipal and some state-level banks). In other 
cases, national public banks operate locally, nationally, and internationally. And while it 
is true that the core spatial strategies of public banks most often prioritize local and 
national development strategies, in some cases public banks reach out internationally (that 
is, promoting domestic exports; supporting national companies abroad; as part of the 
bank’s profitability and expansion strategies; and/or supporting international 
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  cf. Tricarico 2015:13; NCE 2016:51; Romero 2017:17. 
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development). These programmes will have stronger and weaker links to public banks’ 
different mandates, and need to be assessed accordingly for fit. Where spatial strategies 
risk the public interest, are anti-democratic, or privilege the private over public interest, 
they ought to be abandoned. 
 
How public banks navigate their spatial operations can have significant developmental, 
governance, and risk implications. For example, governance and autonomy issues may 
arise between local projects or foreign aid beneficiaries being funded by large national 
public banks that may wish to determine the nature of the project over local interests. 
Given this complexity, public banks should support democratically elected authorities at 
the scale at which the authorities are responsible (for example, at the municipal, provincial 
or state, and national levels) so long as these projects conform to mandated priorities .10 
There is a significant need for more inclusive and democratically driven processes, and 
in particular so that public banks’ spatial strategies do not favour or reproduce already 
existing spatial, class, and gendered inequalities, environmental degradation, and unequal 
relationships or power and privilege (cf. Romero 2017:16). In other words, public banks 
operating in the public interest can play a central role in the construction of more equitable 
and environmentally resilient community spaces. 
 
Spatial strategies must also take a hard look at problems of financial risk and 
responsibility (particularly vis-à-vis internationalization). Public banks are usually 
backed by public guarantees, which raises the problem of whether theirlending activities 
exceed the government scale ultimately responsible for any losses incurred. What 
happens if a national public bank operates globally and incurs substantial losses in its 
international operations (as during the 2008-09 global financial crisis)? Who will or 
should absorb the losses? The spatial strategies of public banks, therefore, should not 
exceed a magnitude where should things go wrong it jeopardizes the public interest of the 
community ultimately responsible. 
 
Finally, it needs emphasizing that spatial strategy involves questions of national coverage 
and aspects of financial inclusion (to use World Bank [2014] jargon). Public banks’ 
spatial operations should consider societal needs, for example, the need to provide 
dispersed financial services in a modern economy; to protect at-risk environments; to 
target poverty alleviation, both domestically and internationally; among others. The 
heterodox rediscovery of public banks has focused almost exclusively on policy or 
development banks (Barone and Spratt 2015; Mazzucato and Penna 2015). Yet public 
development banks typically have few branch locations, and these are often in central 
urban locations. By contrast, public commercial, universal, and cooperative banks may 
be widely dispersed, and hence useful for achieving dispersed coverage. While little 
discussed, a strategy of financial collaboration between commercial and developmental 
public banks can effectively combine assets and expertise to reach spaces in need. In this 
regard, public banks have been historically adept at overcoming spatial challenges and 
facilitating integration. 
3.4 Democratization of Governance 
An underlying premise of this paper is that for public banks to be substantively green, 
their governance (that is, ownership and control) structures must also be democratized 
and oriented towards the public interest. This includes considering how to democratically 
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  The question of public bank governance and democracy is obviously complicated by real world cases where the 
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where representative democracy is present, the public banks operating therein should work collaboratively and 
transparently with their governing authorities. 
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align public bank operations with national and local development plans (Romero 
2017:15). By no means is it the case that historically “successful” developmental projects 
and associated public bank interventions have necessarily been democratic in orientation 
or particularly concerned with social, environmental, or workers’ rights. On this front, the 
much-heralded East Asian developmental model stands out, as much of its economic 
achievements were premised on the suppression of worker and socio-political rights (as 
well as environmental) (Radice 2008; Chang 2013). This is not the ideal model to follow 
from a public interest, environmental, gendered, or worker’s optic. National authorities 
and public banks must be held to a higher standard if they are to sustainably contribute to 
a green and equitable future. Popular social forces must be able to protect against public 
banks being abused by powerful elites for their private interests. This entails 
democratization; transparency and accountability; and insulation from undue pressure. 
Democratizing public banks 
Public banks need clear democratic governance mechanisms in place that enable the 
public to shape and steer mandated operations, while being armoured against undue and 
undemocratic influence (below). In short, private interests must not be equated with or 
allowed to malign the public interest. There is no denying that private interests have at 
times overridden the public interest in public banking for very real and historically 
specific reasons. Presently, there is a real risk of this re-occurring within the global 
“green” revolution. International financial institutions (IFIs) and other market advocates 
have calmed their calls for bank privatization but, in lieu, advocate that public banks 
underwrite and absorb the risks of private investment in (ideally green) infrastructure 
(WEF 2006; OECD 2017). Should this proceed unchallenged, private interests will 
supplant the public interest and likely exacerbate the already grave problems of achieving 
a LCCR future. Democratic governance must guard against challenges like this by 
opening public banks up to inclusive popular control and oversight. 
 
Two broad models of democratic governance currently predominate among public banks: 
corporatized and representative democratic. A third model can be seen among cooperative 
banks: inclusive democratic. 
 
The corporatized governance model has become more prevalent under neoliberalism, and 
it is the one preferred by conventional economists as a second-best option to privatization. 
Corporatization refers to the tendency of public companies to behave like private 
companies, wherein decision-making processes are firewalled from direct government 
and democratic influence (cf. Shirley 1999). Typically, corporatized public entities 
provide some form of essential public service, but then operate primarily around private-
oriented financialized performance indicators, cost-reflexive pricing, and competitive 
outsourcing rather than in the public interest per se (McDonald and Ruiters 2012). That 
said, even within corporatized public enterprises there are variants – as some respond 
more to public service priorities than market imperatives. In a corporatized model, 
nevertheless, ownership does not necessarily translate into effective public control of a 
public bank, even though there will be mechanisms by which governments retain control 
over key appointments of often independent board directors. 
 
A representative democratic form of governance remains common among public banks. 
In this model, the government as majority shareholder will have legal rights to 
representation (often in controlling degrees) in the Board of Directors. In many instances, 
specified government ministers assume positions of power and authority. For example, a 
minister of the economy will be specified as the Chair and the ruling government or 
legislature will have the right to appoint members to the Board. Here ownership tends to 
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involve substantive political control over the mandate and strategic direction of a public 
bank, which then shapes its day-to-day operations. As expected, there are varieties of 
more top-down and bottom-up configurations, which reflect more or less democratic and 
accountable variants. While governments employ the range of variants to exercise control, 
conventional economists argue any such control politicizes the bank and renders it 
inefficient and corruptible (La Porta et al. 2002; Boehmer et al. 2005). 
 
An inclusive democratic model is more characteristic of cooperative banks, including 
ones constituted under public law or backed by state authorities (cf. Périlleux and Nyssens 
2017). In this model, cooperative associates and representatives of the bank’s wider 
community will form part of the bank’s governing assembly. The governing assembly 
sets the bank’s overall strategic direction and appoints members of the Board of Directors. 
This model of governance tends to be the most democratic, with the most substantive ties 
to its affected community. 
 
Of these three models, the representative and inclusive forms are the modes of governance 
most amenable to democratic oversight and accountability, which can then enable the 
bank to function legitimately in the public interest. This process should involve specific 
means of drawing in public concerns and interests via different types of actors and 
representatives within the bank’s governance. Democratization here is not meant to 
“depoliticize” the bank’s decision-making processes, but to insulate it from individua l 
political abuse by opening it up to democratic deliberation. As Romero suggests, “it is 
important to recognise that institutions governed on the basis of a truly democratic 
governance structure should find ways of including other actors – not just governments – 
in the decision-making process” (2017:21). This is not just wishful thinking, as 
characterized by conventional economists. Indeed, the democratic credentials of well-run 
public services are making their way back into popular discourse (McDonald 2016). 
According to Ben Tarnoff of The Guardian,11 
 
… public services offer a more equitable way to satisfy basic needs. By taking 
things off the market, government can democratize access to the resources that 
people rely on to lead reasonably dignified lives. Those resources can be offered 
cheap or free, funded by progressive taxation. They can also be managed by 
publicly accountable institutions led by elected officials, or subject to more direct 
mechanisms of popular control. 
 
While the potential is there, it must be remembered that these credentials are the result of 
social struggle and democratic protections, which must find institutional footing within 
public institutions and law. 
Strong transparency and accountability 
Democratization requires strong transparency and accountability mechanisms that ensure 
and protect open communication, feedback, and inclusive decision-making processes as 
a matter of standard practice. At the most basic level, this demands reversing past 
institutional practices that have enabled bank secrecy and impunity, both public and 
private. In this way, the public can help ensure that the practices and projects that are unfit 
for purpose are ended. 
 
Public bank transparency should be founded on the right to access information held by 
public authorities on public banks (Romero 2017:23). Following the work of Eurodad, 
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the right of access to information should be substantive. Internally, public banks should 
automatically disclose all key documentation and prepare publicly accessible reports on 
their activities. This includes core information on public banks’ clients, subclients, and 
end-use of public funds offered. That is, transparency must be present along the full chain 
of public lending activities. Furthermore, transparency requirements should be built into 
contractual agreements. The public must have the right to request and receive  
information, data, and contractual agreements. That said, effective, administrable 
procedures must be put in place so as not to overburden public banks and their employees, 
especially smaller public banks, with potentially onerous freedom of information 
requests. The most desirable and easiest way is simply to make public banking data open 
access (without violating individual security). Finally, transparency must also involve 
access to decision-making processes in order that the public can hold Board and Assembly 
members accountable. 
 
Public bank accountability in turn enables multiple actors to hold public bank decision 
makers to account (Romero 2017:23). Reasonably, these actors should include affected 
governments, parliaments, civil society and non-governmental organizations, alongside 
local communities and social sectors (unions, teachers, environmental groups, and so on). 
Public banks and authorities should allocate sufficient resources to have regular and 
independent evaluations of the banks’ operations. Finally, public banks need to have 
established, user-friendly, and independent complaints mechanisms that protect 
complainants and whistle-blowers. 
Insulation from undue pressure 
By nature of ownership and control, public banks can be and are subject to undue political 
and elite pressure. This threat is magnified by the control public banks have over money.  
There are several ways governments and powerful interests have abused public banks in 
the past for reasons not in the public interest. For example, public banks have extended 
questionable “related” loans to Board members or government elites. Public banks have 
increased lending as elections near, arguably to support the ruling government. Similarly, 
public banks have been instructed to support government pet projects that lack substantive 
justification. The World Bank, itself a state-owned bank, has documented many such 
abuses. 
 
There are also other contentious and less clear-cut ways in which undue government 
pressure can cause public banks to act against a triple bottom line of green transformation, 
social development, and financial sustainability. For one, there are the risks associated 
with countercyclical lending at times of crisis, as discussed in 1.2 above. For another, 
public bank rescues of certain enterprises (public and private) deserve extreme scrutiny 
vis-à-vis the public interest. Finally, undue government pressure can include wider 
measures that undermine the democratic expression of the public bank itself. For 
example, national governments can subject public banks to international treaties that 
undermine their capacity to fulfil their mandates and work in the public interest (for 
example, EU Competition Law and emerging treaties like the Trade in Services 
Agreement [TiSA]) (Marois 2017a). Likewise, national legislation can also prohibit 
public bank workers from legally taking strike action, which is contrary to basic worker 
rights. To recognize the need to insulate public banks from undue pressure (public and 
private) is not to say that public banks are, by nature, corrupt, as claimed by conventional 
economists. Rather it is to acknowledge the historically specific and malleable social 
content of public banks and the significant power associated with their ability to allocate 
credit. 
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3.5 Integral Integration of Workplace and Community 
Public banks and their employees, by nature of their financial intermediation functions, 
are integrally connected to their communities in economic terms, but this must also be 
made so in socio-political terms. It is important, therefore, that these public financial 
institutions seek to build a strong public ethos – or duty of care – both within the 
institution and through the institution into its community via its financial activities and 
spatially constitutive operations. Through a culture of public service, public bank 
mandates ought to serve the public interest by promoting the triple bottom line . 
Integrating a culture of public service requires internal institutional promotion, support, 
and training. Only by modelling the public interest internally can it be effectively instilled 
externally. 
Right for employees to unionize and to collective action 
As an integral element of the public interest, public banks must uphold the basic right for 
their employees to be able to self-organize into unions in order to advance and represent 
their interests as workers in the workplace – that is, the right to collective action and to 
strike. A public bank cannot serve the public interest if its own employees cannot exercise 
basic human rights. Nor can public ethos characterize a public bank’s operations if its 
employees cannot develop or articulate their own collective interests. Unfortunately, 
today the right to strike for bank workers remains nowhere near universal. 
Build internal expertise and capacity 
Neoliberal advocates have championed the debasement of the public sector, seeing ideals 
of public service as naïve.12 Rebuilding and reclaiming public expertise and capacity is 
the key to rebuilding public trust (Wainwright 2014). To this end, public banks should be 
committed to the betterment, advancement, and empowerment of their employees. This 
involves having a long-term strategic outlook towards employee benefits and capacity 
building such that internal capacity and expertise are developed. This must entail training 
specific to the public sector, to a public ethos, and to long-term and equitable 
environmental goals: it is not the case that corporate or private sector training should be 
grafted directly to public sector operations. Where public banks have built up expertise 
and capacity there are knock-on benefits for the community, other public services, and 
the government as such knowledge and expertise can be shared more easily in non-
competitive public–public cooperation and in support of governing capacity. 
Effective communal integration and outreach 
As raised above in terms of spatial strategy, finance is a common aspect of everyday life 
in most communities, connecting disparate individuals, collectives, and communities. Yet 
the rise of neoliberalism has brought with it intensified financial capitalism and economic 
instability (Lapavitsas 2009; Marois 2011). The associated competitive imperatives pit 
individuals and communities against each other in a race to the bottom of regulatory, 
environmental, social, and economic rule in the name of capital accumulation and 
maximizing returns. This conflicts with the needs of a common, public interest and with 
the needs of a green transformation (cf. EPSC 2017). 
 
Public banks, like other public institutions, can practice non-competitive cooperation as 
a matter of mandate and good public practice in ways that promote common efficiencies 
over private accumulation (cf. Kishimoto and Petitjean 2017; Marois 2017a). For 
example, the integral integration of public banks into their affected communities can help 
promote solidarity and cooperation between workers, community associations, 
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bureaucrats, politicians, NGOs, end users, and with other public services (health, water, 
electricity, roads, other) and/or between other levels of service delivery. This cooperation 
can be geared towards collectively addressing societal challenges like climate change , 
essential services provisioning, and social inequality, which necessarily demands the 
sharing of knowledge, trust, and promising “best” practices. As institutions connected 
across the social and economic spheres, public banks also can engage in outreach 
programmes that can support development capacity and a cooperative public ethos. This 
outreach need not be limited to the immediate community, but in some cases may expand 
abroad. In short, the social content of public and cooperative finance can promote 
collective solutions to common challenges.13 The answer is as much socio-political as 
economic. 
4. Conclusion: Towards a Green Public Bank in the 
Public Interest 
The global environmental crisis and the need to finance a radical transformation in how 
we reproduce ourselves globally, notably via a transition to a LCCR future, have pushed 
the question of public banks to the forefront of international debate. Yet the narrative 
around public banks has been largely captured and shaped by market-based development 
advocates who are demanding that public banks be mobilized in the private interest.  
Alternative strategies and conceptualizations must be put forward, and these need to be 
crafted around the public interest, long-term sustainability, and social equity concerns. 
To this end, this paper has proposed an ideal-type public bank, which has been elaborated 
around five core features: mandated role; financial sustainability; operational strategy; 
democratization of governance; and integral integration of workplace and community. 
 
While technical in appearance, the features and associated characteristics presented exist 
in real world cases, having been drawn from multiple public banks from around the world 
(cf. Marois 2013). For example, specific features have been taken from the French Caisse 
des Dépôts; the Turkish IlBank, Ziraat, and Halkbank; Finland’s Kuntarahoitus; the China 
Development Bank; the Nordic Investment Bank; the US Bank of North Dakota; the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa; various European savings banks; the State Bank 
of India; the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies; the German North Rhine-Westphalia 
Bank; the Dutch Nederlandse Waterschapsbank; the Philippines LandBank; among many 
others. Some of the most promising (if imperfect) public banks, from a green 
transformational and equity perspective, include the German public development (or 
“promotional” bank), the KfW, and the Costa Rican retail bank, Banco Popular y de 
Desarollo Comunal. These two examples combine a number of promising features, such 
as democratic governance and financial sustainability, with gender, equity, and 
sustainability mandates. 
 
Each characteristic presented is defendable (if not bulletproof!) from a public interest, 
equity, and green transformational perspective. If asked for an alternative vision for 
public banks, the one envisioned here is worth debating. 
 
Across the features and through the various characteristics, this paper has also put forward 
three interrelated and underlying claims. First, for a public bank to be in fact sustainable, 
green, and in the public interest it must also be democratic. Non-democratized public 
banks are more easily corruptible and susceptible to abuse for private interests. Second, 
public banks need reconceptualizing away from conventional approaches that have 
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portrayed them as inherently corrupt and inefficient, regardless of time or place. What 
public banks are and do instead depends on the historical social, political, and economic 
power relations defining them as institutions. Progressive public banks exist because 
progressive values have gone into them. As importantly, existing banks can be changed 
for the better. Third, while reclaiming public banks for the public interest is a necessary 
condition in the struggle for a progressive green transformation, it is not sufficient. Public 
banks will only work in the public interest within a wider economic and political shift 
towards a just and equitable strategy of social reproduction. But this is a reflexive 
relationship. Societies committed to green, socially just goals are more likely to have 
similarly mandated public banks. Likewise, such mandated public banks are more likely 
to support the reinforcement of green, socially just societies. In other words, public banks 
cannot be divorced from the society in which they exist, nor can societies committed to 
green, socially just ends hope to fulfil these without powerful public financial institutions 
able and willing to support them. 
 
There is now a global acceptance of the potential green catalytic role of public banks. But 
the potential of their role is being skewed towards providing for private interests over and 
above the public interest, especially regarding climate finance. There is an urgent need to 
reclaim public banking for the public interest in order to effect a just and equitable green 
transformation. We need not idealize these public financial institutions, but we must 
propose justifiable, sustainable, and equitable alternatives if we hope to reclaim them for 
the collective public interest. 
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